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Abstract 
Twitter remains one of the most popular social media network sites in use today and con-
tinues to attract criticism over the volume of unsavoury and illegal content circulated by its 
users. When breaches of legislation occur, appropriate officials are left with the task of 
identifying and apprehending the physical user of an offending account, which is not always 
a simple task. This article provides a law enforcement practitioner focused analysis of the 
Twitter platform and associated services for the purposes of offender identification. Using 
our bespoke message harvesting tool ‘Twitterstream’, an analysis of the data available via 
Twitter’s Streaming and REST APIs are presented, along with the message metadata which 
can be gleaned. The process of identifying those behind offending Twitter accounts is dis-
cussed in line with available API content and current Twitter data retention policies in order 
to support law enforcement investigations surrounding this social media platform. 
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1 Introduction 
Through the commercialisation of the Internet, modern day communication protocols have 
been revolutionised. Cyberspace provides a place for the instantaneous transfer of data 
between individuals both known and unknown to each other. Now, we have the concept 
of social media, defined by Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) as ‘a group of Internet-based appli-
cations that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that 
allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content’. These provisions are now 
common place in society, with estimates showing around 2.2 billion social network users 
worldwide (Statista, 2016e), where multiple variations exist outside of what can arguably 
be categorised as bigger players (Facebook, Twitter, for example). Yet social media can be 
considered a relatively new phenomena, where despite some instances of social media 
networking sites such as SixDegrees.com existing in the late 1990’s, it was not until 2003 
and the advent of MySpace, followed soon by Facebook in 2004 did this area generate 
significant interest (Boyd and Ellison, 2007). Now it is hard to imagine a world without these 
forms of communication as they have become embedded into almost all aspects of life.  
 
Despite the existence of numerous social media networking sites, this article focuses on 
Twitter. Twitter ‘is an information network made up of 140-character messages called 
Tweets’ (Twitter, n.d.a) and as of 2016, has a recorded 310 million active accounts (Statista, 
2016a). The functionality of Twitter is relatively simple, after creating their account users 
can Tweet content which unless protected in their account settings, remains publically 
available. Users can also ‘follow’ other user accounts and view their posted content, or be 
‘followed’, whereby other users can passively observe their actions or interact by way of 
messages or replies (see Kwak, et al., 2010 for an in-depth account of the functionality of 
Twitter). Although definitive statistics are difficult to obtain, Twitter is widely reported to 
witness thousands of Tweets (Twitter’s coined term for message) per minute which has led 
to billions of resident messages. Twitter remains one of the most popular social media plat-
forms in use, often a forum for public expression of opinion on current affairs and matters 
of interest in the public eye, in real time. To provide an example of Twitter usage volume, 
Barack Obama’s 2012 re-election resulted in over 300,000 tweets per minute (Statista, 
2016c) with the post halftime show at Super Bowl 2016 attracting over 150,000 tweets per 
minute (Statista, 2016d).  
 
Inevitably, with such a large populace engaging with the Twitter platform both positive and 
negative usage characteristics are frequently witnessed. Twitter has frequently attracted 
criticism for the volume of abusive and malicious content posted. This problem is best de-
scribed by Scaife (2013) who states, ‘due to the anonymity social media affords, users can 
potentially express unrestrained and harmful content’. Arguments surrounding freedom of 
speech are often conveyed in defence of posted online content, yet users do not have free 
reign to express anything they wish, with multiple jurisdictions having sought to legislate 
on content which is legally acceptable. This has led to regulatory issues surrounding Twitter 
and the development of strategies for policing such large volumes of traffic, and, detecting 
and prosecuting those liable for breaches.   
 
Focusing on Twitter, this article first analyses English law discussing the regulations in place 
for defining acceptable usage. With a need to identify and prosecute those who breach 
aforementioned legislation, a discussion of Twitter’s application programming interfaces 
(APIs), both Streaming API and REST API is offered and their use for gathering Twitter mes-
sage content (see Section 3). We also demonstrate our bespoke ‘Twitterstream’ applica-
tion; a method for invoking Twitter’s APIs for the collection, analysis and presentation, and 
preservation of Twitter message content. For the purpose of offender identification, Twit-
ter message metadata fields are highlighted and their relevance discussed in an effort to 
support law enforcement investigations of this type. Finally regulatory issues involving 
Twitter are discussed and concluding thoughts offered.  
 
2 The Dark Side of Twitter 
In 2015, there were over 5,500 data removal requests submitted by government agencies, 
police and courts worldwide (Statista, 2016b), with Twitter now frequently identified as a 
platform which is used for online abuse. Applications to Twitter for account personal infor-
mation by UK organisations doubled in 2015 making it the biggest requester for Twitter 
data in the European Union (BBC News, 2015). O’Flinn (2013) highlights this issues stating 
‘Twitter has unleashed offensive behaviour of a type unseen in real life’, leading to signifi-
cant regulatory issues. Jack Dorsey, CEO of Twitter recently acknowledged the harassment 
and misuse that takes place via the service (BBC News, 2016a), where incidents include 
racial abuse (BBC News, 2012a; BBC News, 2016b), death threats (BBC News, 2016c), men-
acing communications (BBC News, 2012b), contempt of court (BBC News, 2011) and libel 
(BBC News, 2012c; BBC News, 2013a). Trolling (deliberate behaviour designed to provoke 
a reaction) is now commonly witnessed on Twitter, and the platform could be perceived as 
largely unregulated due in part to its size, where breaches of legislation of frequently wit-
nessed.  
 
The following provides an overview of the various types of infringement of English law 
which can occur on Twitter (see also CPS (n.d.b) and Athena Forensics (n.d.)). 
 
Act: Contempt of Court 
Notable Instances: Circulation of images of killer Jon Venables (BBC News, 2013b), 
breached injunction of Ryan Giggs (BBC News, 2011). 
 
What is it?: The Crown Prosecution Service (n.d.a) guidance defines contempt as "an act or 
omission calculated to interfere with the administration of justice". In Dallas v United King-
dom (Application No.38395/12), specific attention was drawn to jurors on the potential 
liability for contempt of court where Twitter and other social media platforms to inform 
additional persons regarding the details of the case. In fact, Agate and Ledward (2014) in-
dicate that it is now common practice for judges to specifically warn jurors not to engage 
with case-related social media. Providing a notable example, in HM Attorney General v Lid-
dle [2013] EWHC 1455 (Admin), the defendant Dean Liddle was convicted for contempt of 
court for posting images of convicted killers Venables and Thompson as adults on Twitter 
in breach of a global injunction preventing the publication of their new identities. The issue 
of social media usage in courtroom proceedings is not solely confined to the UK, where 
concerns in jurisdictions such as the US exist (Lee, 2010; Dysart and Kimbrough, 2013; Hoff-
meister, 2015). 
 
Act: Credible Threat 
Notable Instances: See consideration of what constitutes a ‘credible threat in Chambers v 
DPP [2012] EWHC 2157 
 
What is it?: Crown Prosecution Service (n.d.b) guidance define credible threats as one of 
the following categories. 
 
1. Offences Against the Person Act 1861 Section 16 - ‘A person who without lawful 
excuse makes to another a threat, intending that that other would fear it would be 
carried out, to kill that other or a third person’. 
2. Protection from Harassment Act 1997 Section 4 - ‘A person whose course of con-
duct causes another to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence will be used 
against him is guilty of an offence if he knows or ought to know that his course of 
conduct will cause the other so to fear on each of those occasions’. 
3. Malicious Communications Act 1988 Section 1 - prohibits the sending of an elec-
tronic communication which conveys a threat. 
 
Threatening communications sent via social media platforms are also regulated in a num-
ber jurisdictions including Europe and the US (O'Connor, 2013). 
 
Act: Grossly offensive, indecent or menacing electronic communications breaching Com-
munications Act 2003. 
Notable Instances: Chambers v DPP [2012] EWHC 2157 
 
What is it?: Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 regulates the improper use of 
public electronic communications networks:.   
 
(1)A person is guilty of an offence if he— 
 
(a) sends by means of a public electronic communications network a mes-
sage or other matter that is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or 
menacing character; or 
 
(b) causes any such message or matter to be so sent. 
 
(2)A person is guilty of an offence if, for the purpose of causing annoyance, in-
convenience or needless anxiety to another, he— 
 
(a) sends by means of a public electronic communications network, a mes-
sage that he knows to be false, 
 
(b) causes such a message to be sent; or 
 
(c) persistently makes use of a public electronic communications network 
 
The case of Chambers (referred to as the Twitter joke trial (Akhtar, 2014)) surrounding the 
post of the Tweet "Crap! Robin Hood airport is closed. You’ve got a week and a bit to get 
your shit together otherwise I’m blowing the airport sky high.” by Paul Chambers. Cham-
bers was charged under Section 127(1) Communications Act 2003, which was later quashed 
on appeal. In addition, Newcastle University student Joshua Cryer was charged under Sec-
tion 127 Communications Act 2003 for sending racist messages for former professional 
footballer Stan Collymore (BBC News, 2012d). See also offences under the Public Order Act 
1986 and the case of Liam Stacey (albeit charged under Section 4A Public order Act 1986), 
who ‘received a 56-day jail term after tweeting ‘LOL’ [“laugh out loud”] in response to the 
on-pitch collapse of the footballer Fabrice Muamba and subsequently posting racist and 
offensive comments when other users criticised him’ (Scaife, 2013, pg.5). Further those 
who utilise Twitter to incite racial hatred via Twitter may be liable under the Public Order 
Act 1986 (see case of Michael Doyle who was alleged to have incited racial hatred after the 
Brussels attacks (BBC News, 2016d)). 
 
As a separate instance, those utilising Twitter accounts linked with terrorist organisations 
or supporting such content may also face liability (Spencer, 2017). Spencer (2017, p503) 
indicates that in the US,  suspected supporters ‘of ISIS who have been arrested have been 
charged is 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012) “which punishes “[w]hoever knowingly or attempts or 
conspires to do so”’. 
 
Defamation (an act which damages the reputation of another) cases stemming from Twit-
ter are also a concern with both professional cricketer Chris Cairns (Cairns v Modi [2012] 
EWHC 756 (QB)) and politician Alistair Mcalpine (McAlpine v Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342 
(QB)) successfully claiming damages for Tweets made. The impact of Twitter usage can also 
be witnessed in professional sport where the English Football Association (FA) have repri-
manded numerous professional football players including Mario Balotelli and Rio Ferdi-
nand for unacceptable use of the Twitter platform (Coe, 2015; Carpenter and Pendlebury, 
2015). Defamation is a legal concept acknowledged beyond the UK (see case involving 
Courtney Love - Gordon & Holmes v. Love, No. B256367 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2016)), how-
ever Allen (2014) suggest few cases in this area in relation to Twitter have made it to trial 
in the United States.  
 
Regardless of the offence committed on Twitter, in order to effectively prosecute, the in-
dividual responsible for the act must be identified. To do this, information regarding an 
offending tweet must be gathered. 
 
3 Gathering Tweets and their Metadata 
The gathering of social media content during an applicable criminal investigation is an act 
often carried out by law enforcement. Brannan (2013) indicates that during the England 
Riots in 2011, Twitter was actively monitored by law enforcement, and as a public network, 
without breaching Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights as "where some-
one does an act in public, the observance and recording of that act will ordinarily not give 
rise to an expectation of privacy" (Gillespie, 2009, pg.555).  
 
As Twitter is a real-time messaging service, the content resident on this platform is volatile, 
and in cases where a breach is established, information gathering processes must act 
quickly. Where offending messages have been posted, once identified, it is reasonable to 
assume that any offender may seek to delete any offending content and/or deactivate their 
account. Twitter user policies state that deactivation places the account in queue for dele-
tion, where user data relating to the account is only kept for 30 days (a reactivation period), 
where content may still be available on Twitter up to a few days after deactivation (Twitter, 
2016a), which once lapsed deletion takes place in approximately a further week. Content 
which has been deleted by a Twitter user is generally not available on Twitter servers (Twit-
ter, 2016b). In order to prevent offender data from being lost, ‘preservation requests’ are 
accepted by Twitter, where data is stored for 90 days (a request to extend this initial period 
can also be made) and not disclosed until the necessary authority is acquired (Twitter, 
2016b). There are two main issues here, time and cooperation. Legal processes are notori-
ously slow, where delays could result in retained date no longer being available, as noted 
by Labour MP Lilian Greenwood (HC Deb (2014) 588 col. 14). Further, Twitter is a U.S. based 
organisation where cooperation with foreign jurisdictions and legal practices is not guar-
anteed (see sections 4 & 5 for further discussion).   
 
As a result reliance cannot be solely placed upon Twitter by law enforcement alone to ac-
quire and retain all metadata regarding any offending users. As Twitter provides access to 
both the Streaming and REST APIs, section 3 will provide an analysis of information gleaned 
from Twitter using these APIs via our Twitterstream platform, which is designed to harvest, 
store and analyse publicly available Twitter hosted content. We will then evaluate the con-
tent of this data in section 4 for the purpose of identifying physical account users. 
 
3.1 Twitterstream 
Twitter's APIs are frequently utilised in the gathering of message content for research and 
analysis. Research includes the gathering of message data to establish political consensus 
surrounding the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union ((Llewellyn and Cram 
(2016)), malicious URL detection (Venkatesh et al., 2017), stock price prediction (Kordonis 
et al., 2016) event detection (Li et al., 2012; Alsaedi et al., 2017), cyber-threat detection 
(Mittal et al., 2016) and the fallout from natural disasters (Gupta et al, 2013;  Murthy et al., 
2016). The Twitterstream application is designed to capture publically available data from 
Twitter in both real time and retrospectively via their two APIs (discussed below), storing 
tweets and their associated metadata in an attached database instance.  
 
1. Streaming API: The Streaming API provides access to globally available Twitter data 
in real time. In addition to the text of the tweet and any attached imagery and 
hyperlinks, the API also supplies the full set of metadata associated with the tweet, 
including information on the account, its holder and location, and system or plat-
form used to send the tweet (see appendix 1 for Twitter’s comprehensive 
metadata field breakdown).  
 
2. REST API: The REST API allows the recovery of tweets for a period of time after their 
publication. Our tests showed that tweets can only be recovered if they are no 
more than approximately nine days old (although this timeframe is variable and 
dependent on the volume of traffic related to a particular handle or hashtag), 
backed by Twitter’s discussion of the API’s functionality (Twitter, n.d.b).  A caveat 
of the REST API is that message capture is selective where Twitter states it is not a 
comprehensive recovery of data with focus maintained on the relevance of the 
message, not a complete recall of data, meaning some historical messages may not 
be captured, despite being within the nine data time frame (Twitter, n.d.b.). 
 
The Twitterstream interface (shown in Figure 1) supports user interaction with any cap-
tured Twitter data whilst allowing the submission of queries and the review and analysis of 
results. Data which is captured through Twitterstream is stored in an SQL Server database. 
The interface includes a Google Maps overlay, which displays the location of tweets subject 
to location data being available.  
 
 
Figure 1: The Twitterstream web interface 
 
3.2 Twitterstream components 
Twitterstream has three main structural components with each discussed in turn.  
 
1. The engine of the system is a Java application, which runs on a virtual server and 
connects to Twitter’s Streaming API via the Twitter4J library (Twitter4J, n.d.). An 
overview of this process is presented in Figure 2. 
  
Figure 2: Java application overview  
User defined search parameters are first stored in the database as strings (1). When 
a Twitter stream is initiated, the user can chose their appropriate Boolean search 
values (AND, OR etc.) which is automatically embedded into the search string. 
Search string criteria can be profile handles, hashtags, text content and also 
metadata relating to the tweet such as geolocation information. The application 
uses application-user authentication (Twitter, n.d.c) to connect to the Streaming 
API (2).  Credentials linked to a specific Twitter account are passed via an OAuth 
request (see http://oauth.net/). As Twitter does not allow several connections to 
its Streaming API with the same credentials, individual search parameters are 
merged into a single, query string (3), this way, only a single connection is required, 
improving the efficiency of the search process. A connection to the Streaming API 
involves making a long-lived HTTP request followed by parsing response data in 
turn (Twitter, n.d.d). Tweets containing any of the words in the amalgamated query 
string are periodically returned to the application (4) and filtered to ensure that 
each individual tweets is correctly linked to its source search parameter (5). 
Twitterstream is hosted on a cloud server with scalable resources allowing addi-
tional processing power and memory to be configured at runtime if required.  
2. The data storage component is provided by a Microsoft SQL Server instance, run-
ning on its own dedicated virtual server with scalable resources. This form of local 
storage means that once harvested, message data can be stored in a non-volatile 
state, where further querying and analysis can take place. 
 
Figure 3: Database structure 
To provide an overview of Figure 3, the link_params_results table exists because a 
single result (i.e. tweet) could be linked to more than one search parameter. This 
is the most efficient way of storing tweets, as each tweet only exists once in the 
database. Similarly, a single result can have multiple coordinates. Again, it's more 
efficient to store them in a separate table. 
3. The third component is a web interface which is written in Adobe ColdFusion.  The 
web interface allows users to create new queries, view and sort result sets, export 
result sets to Microsoft Excel, and view tweets with geolocation data on a Google 
Map (see Figure 4). The web interface also allows users to backfill result sets ret-
rospectively, using the monkehTweet ColdFusion wrapper (RIAForge, n.d.) which 
connects to Twitter’s REST API. 
 
Figure 4: Web Interface and REST API 
In relation to the backfill process using REST API, a connection is first established 
with Twitter via an OAuth request, the same as with the Java application (1). Next, 
a one off HTTP request is sent to the REST API (essentially containing the search 
query ('q'), count ('100') and result_type ('recent'). (See https://dev.twit-
ter.com/rest/reference/get/search/tweets) (2). A max of 100 results (matching 
tweets) at one time are returned to the ColdFusion application (3). Once received, 
the results are saved in the Twitterstream database for later analysis.  
3.2.1 Limitations of the API Usage 
Twitter’s APIs can only be used to extract information accounts deemed ‘active’. The prob-
lem this presents is that there remains ambiguity surrounding the actions that are required 
to deem an account active. Twitter accounts which are first registered are not active, where 
guidance (Twitter, 2016c) indicates activity to be based on actions such as the volume of 
tweets, re-tweeted messages mentions (profile handle included in other messages). There-
fore offenders who create new accounts solely for the purpose of offending may not have 
the accounts deemed active quick enough to have their content included in the API data.  
 
A further limitation stems from those who opt to protect their messages. Protected ac-
counts cannot have their data passively collected using Twitterstream and Twitter’s APIs. 
However, law enforcement may still be able to access a user’s protected messages by 
obtaining the relevant legal documentation and following Twitter’s formal procedures for 
requesting a disclosure of a user’s account information (Horsman, 2017; Twitter, 2016b). 
 
3.2.2. Twitterstream Summary 
The Twitterstream framework provides a dynamic method for collecting, storing and ana-
lysing Twitter message content via Twitter’s public APIs. Given that Twitterstream allows 
message metadata collection both by targeted (i.e. from a particular account handle) and 
large scale (such as a hashtag collection) methods, significant volumes of information may 
be collected, which is in need of subsequent storage and analysis. Twitterstream provides 
a method for the flexible and effective allocation of resources for collecting message con-
tent, and robust database storage for housing Twitter data for subsequent querying and 
analysis. Twitterstream’s bespoke interface also provides the user with SQL-based filtering 
options and a visual geographical mapping facility. Although the Twitter’s APIs are available 
for public use, Twitterstream is currently not available to DF practitioners as its resources 
and infrastructure are managed internally. The authors are currently developing the port-
ability of Twitterstream to allow practitioners to implement and utilise the framework in 
Twitter investigations. Expanding Twitterstream’s availability to others will also allow ad-
ditional testing and validation of the framework to take place. 
 
3.3. Message Metadata 
The Twitterstream platform allows the value of data gleaned from Twitter’s APIs for the 
purposes of law enforcement and offender detection to be analysed. Such data is publically 
available and may support an investigation without the need to engage in legal processes 
with the Twitter organisation over data retention and disclosure. In turn, it may in some 
instances provide law enforcement with the necessary information to target specific re-
tained information from Twitter via a submitted request. This is particularly due to the type 
and availability of metadata associated with each message gathered through the APIs.  
 
When acquiring Tweets from Twitter stream, almost 60 distinct metadata fields are asso-
ciated with each message (for a full list, see Appendix 1). However, not all of these fields 
are of potential value to law enforcement during an investigation. To distil this content, 
potentially evidential metadata fields are now highlighted having been verified using a test 
Twitter account and placed into three categories, metadata surrounding message content, 
location and profile information. 
 
3.3.1 Message Contents Fields 
The following are metadata fields gathered via Twitterstream from Twitter’s APIs surround-
ing a potential offending message’s content. 
  
Created_at: A timestamp field denoting the created time of the message. 
 
Text: A string field containing the contents of the message. 
 
Favorite_count: An integer field indicating approximately how many times this Tweet 
has been ‘liked’ by Twitter users. 
 
Id_str: This field is the unique identifier of a message. This information can be used to 
potentially tie a message to a user where only a retweet of an offending message has 
been found (see appendix 1 for an explanation of the linked fields in_reply_to_sta-
tus_id_str and in_reply_to_user_id_str). 
 
3.3.2 Location Information 
The following fields gathered via Twitterstream provide metadata surrounding a potential 
location of an offender.  
 
User_geo_enabled: A boolean field, when true, indicates that the user has enabled the 
possibility of geotagging their Tweets. 
 
Geo_lattitude and geo_longitude. A decimal field denoting location information where 
location services have been activated on the message sender's phone.  
 
user_location. A user defined string for the profile location. This may not be accurate 
and is considered as secondary location information. 
 
3.3.3 User Identification Information 
The following fields gathered via Twitterstream provide metadata surrounding the poten-
tial identification of an offender posting a message.  
 
User_id_str: A string representation of the unique identifier for this User.  
 
User_created_at: A timestamp field denoting the UTC datetime that the user account 
was created on Twitter. 
 
User_description: The user-defined string describing their account. 
 
User_name: A string field showing the name of the user, as they’ve defined it. Not 
necessarily a person’s name. Typically capped at 20 characters. 
 
User_screen_name: A string field showing the screen name, handle, or alias that this 
user identifies themselves with, usually preceded with ‘@’. Screen names are unique 
but subject to change.  
 
3.3.4 Caveat: Metadata Manipulation 
The metadata available via the Twitter APIs cannot in all circumstances be authenticated, 
with particular attention drawn to the location information. Geolocation data is only avail-
able on messages where the user has enabled it both on their mobile device and within the 
Twitter application itself. Kumar et al., (2013) state that only approximately 1% of all tweets 
on Twitter are maintain geolocation information. By default, location data is not initialised, 
therefore arguably in many circumstances location data will not be available. Even where 
location data is initiated by the user, the following three outcomes are possible (having 
been verified through testing using a test Twitter account with messages collected by Twit-
terstream). 
 
1. The user may choose to initialise the option to use their exact location. Here, the 
Geo_lattitude and geo_longitude fields should provide accurate co-ordinates of 
the poster’s position (subject to point 2). 
 
2. It is possible to spoof the geolocation data from the handset. Tests showed that 
utilising the application ‘Fake GPS Location’ (Google Play, 2016), coordinate data 
can be effectively spoofed. In this case, the Geo_lattitude and geo_longitude fields 
supplied to Twitterstream via the APIs cannot be relied upon. There is no way of 
verifying (from the data gathered from the Twitter APIs) whether spoofing has 
taken place, with an analysis of the device used to send the message needed. As 
this would only be available once a suspect has been apprehended, the purpose of 
validating geo-location data is defeated, and therefore location data must be 
treated with caution.  
 
3. Finally, users have the ability to search for a location or venue within the Twitter 
interface, meaning that users can be based in one location but tag the message 
with a different one (for example, post from Manchester and tag the tweet as be-
ing in Liverpool). Tests showed that data gathered from the Twitter API showed 
coordinate data reflected the location chosen by the user, not the actual location. 
As with point 2 above, in general, the Geo_lattitude and geo_longitude fields can-
not be relied upon in all instances. 
 
3.3.5 Data Gathering on Twitter: Examples 
To provide context to the capabilities of Twitterstream and the volume and type of data 
provided through the Twitter Stream and REST API’s the following examples are presented. 
 
3.3.6 Streaming API: Sunderland vs Everton Premier League football game  
Using the Streaming API, the following is a breakdown of extracted data gathered from 
Twitterstream when semantically focused on the Sunderland vs Everton Premier League 
football game taking place on the 11th May 2016 (see Table 1).  
 
The following search parameters were defined: 
 
Table 1. Tweets captured from Sunderland vs Everton Premier League football game 
Search Terms  (generated from local dialect 
and terms associated to the game) 
safc; nufc; ftm; mackem; geordie; 
safcefc; efc; smb; sunvefc; sunefc; 
everton; mags; haway; #sol 
Stream started 11th May 2016 12:50:27 
Stream finished 12th May 2016 16:10:21 
 
 
 
 No. of Tweets Total % Other Info 
Volume of Tweets 271,694 100.00% N/A 
Tweets with exact 
location 
387 0.14% I.e. geo_lattitude + geo_longi-
tude 
Tweets with bound-
ing box  
8666 3.19% I.e. either a rectangular 
bounding box (4 sets of coor-
dinates) or a point of interest 
(1 set of coordinates) 
Tweets from Tyne 
and Wear 
1392 0.51% 42 exact location; 23 points of 
interest; 1327 bounding box 
Tweets from Sun-
derland 
438 0.16% 28 exact location; 22 points of 
interest; 388 bounding box 
 
 
 
3.3.7 Streaming API: European Championships Opening Ceremony 
Using the Streaming API, the following is a breakdown of extracted data gathered from 
Twitterstream when semantically focused on the start of the European Championships 
2016 on 10th June 2016 (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Tweets captured from European Championships Opening Ceremony 
Search Terms  (generated from local dialect 
and terms associated to the game) 
#euro2016 #euro16 #frarom #frarou 
Stream started 10th June 2016 @ 09:58 
Stream finished 11th June 2016 @ 04:06 
 
 
 
 
 No. of Tweets Total % Other Info 
Volume of Tweets 1,192,904 100.00% N/A 
Tweets with exact 
location 
387 0.22% I.e. geo_lattitude + geo_longi-
tude 
Tweets with bound-
ing box  
8666 2.64% I.e. either a rectangular bound-
ing box (4 sets of coordinates) or 
a point of interest (1 set of coor-
dinates) 
Tweets from Paris 1392 0.09% 282 exact location; 0 points of 
interest; 816 bounding box 
 
 
 
3.3.8 Streaming & REST API: Orlando Pulse Shooting 
Using the Streaming and REST APIs, the following is a breakdown of extracted data gath-
ered from Twitterstream when semantically focused on the Orlando Pulse Shooting June 
12th 2016 (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Tweets captured from Orlando Pulse Shooting 
Search Terms  (generated from local dialect 
and terms associated to the game) 
#LoveWins #pulseshooting #pray-
ersForOrlando #Loveislove #PrayFo-
rOrlando #orlando #pulse #pulsenight-
club 
Stream started  12/06/2016 @ 14:11:20 
Stream finished 13/06/2016 @ 09:51:33 
 
 
 
 No. of Tweets Total % Other Info 
Volume of Tweets 384,628 100.00% N/A 
Tweets with exact 
location 
0 0.00% I.e. geo_lattitude + geo_longi-
tude 
Tweets with bound-
ing box  
8845 2.30% I.e. either a rectangular 
bounding box (4 sets of coor-
dinates) or a point of interest 
(1 set of coordinates) 
Tweets from Or-
lando 
226 0.06% 0 exact location; 21 points of 
interest; 205 bounding box 
 
 
 
3.3.9 API Considerations 
Al-garadi et al., (2016) utilised Twitter’s APIs for the gathering of publically available mes-
sage data to develop cyberbullying detection methods and acknowledge the limitations of 
these functions. It must be noted that Twitter does not endorse mass surveillance via its 
API (Twitter, 2016f) and nor does it facilitate it due to incomplete data sets provided. De-
pending on implementation, the APIs do not provide a complete extraction of data. For 
example, if an API user wanted an extraction of all messages containing ‘#security’, the APIs 
only provide a subset of available data. At the time of writing, quantification on the size of 
the subset in terms of what volume of these messages would be collected is not possible, 
but has been noted by  Al-garadi et al., (2016) and others (Cheng and Wicks, 2014; Gonza-
lez-Bailon et al., 2014) to potentially create sample bias due to incomplete downloads. The 
ability for mass collection is limited  when using the freely available APIs. However, a user 
can pay for complete access to 100% of Twitter messages via the APIs or can be acquired 
via 3rd party data resellers (Kumar et al., 2013).  
 
However, the REST API can be effectively utilised for targeted extraction of messages and 
their associated metadata, allowing the last 3200 messages from a Twitter account to be 
extracted searching for a specific Twitter handle (Twitter, 2017). This would allow the re-
porting of a specific tweet to law enforcement and then providing the user account associ-
ated with the message has not deleted the content, associated message metadata can be 
extracted. During tests carried out using a research Twitter account, the REST API was able 
to target and recover posted messages by utilising the account’s Twitter handle. 
 
Where a sample of tweets are sought (for example, from a specific hashtag)  Janetzko 
(2017) indicates that the REST API focuses on relevance as criteria for message recovery, 
rather than completeness therefore not all messages are indexed and potentially retrieva-
ble. As a result, the REST API suffers from the same issues as the Streaming API where 
complete data is not available without cost and historical messages may not be recoverable 
(Janetzko, 2017). However, it is assumed that in instances of malicious tweets, appropri-
ately quick reporting would make the use of the Twitterstream application a viable option. 
In addition, restrictions in the amount of messages which can be downloaded from the 
REST API is also an issue limiting historical data collection (Sheela, 2016). 
 
4 Putting it all Together: Evaluating API Data for Offender Identification 
Where illicit acts are noted, the global reach of Twitter now means that the regulation of 
users and their actions is not straightforward, often involving multiple jurisdictions and 
large geographical areas. Even when breaches of law can be established, identifying an of-
fender in order to instigate prosecution remains difficult and in some cases impossible. The 
fundamental problem posed by Twitter in regards to the aforementioned offences in sec-
tion 2 is the ability to attribute an offending message to a physically identifiable user. There 
is no definitive method for identifying a physical individual who sent a message on Twitter, 
only a series of data which when collated may lead to this outcome. Ledward and Agate 
(2014) best summarise the issue as follows: 
 
“While pressure from UK Government grows on Facebook, Twitter and other social 
media providers to enforce their terms of use in relation to unacceptable/criminal 
content on social media, and to respond more quickly and more effectively to reports 
of abuse, the tension with users’ art.10 and art.8 rights continues, and obtaining 
identity information or content in evidential form remains problematic and time-
consuming in this jurisdiction”. 
 
As discussed in section 3, the metadata fields which can be gathered using Twitterstream 
from Twitter’s APIs often cannot be used alone to attribute a message to an individual. 
Although message content, visible profile information or fields such as user_profile_im-
age_url, may disclose personally identifiable information in some instances, this is not al-
ways the case. Many individuals relinquish the opportunity to apply personally identifiable 
information to their Twitter profile, particularly where they intend to posting offending 
content (Birbeck, 2013). In turn, locational data (providing it is accurate) may place some-
one in a general area or in a best case scenario, a place of residence, but further investiga-
tion of devices is required in order to identify an individual sender.  
 
Where API metadata alone cannot be used to directly identify an offender, the next step is 
to use this information to attribute a message to a specific account. However, support from 
Twitter may be limited, where Colin Crowell, Twitter’s head of public policy indicated that 
most Twitter data retained is already available through the APIs (Joint Committee on the 
Draft Communications Data Bill, 2013).  
 
Where additional account information is needed from Twitter, reliance must be placed 
upon Twitter and their maintenance of user logs for account holders. Using API metadata 
such as the Id_str and User_Id_str it may be feasible for Twitter to identify an active of-
fending account. At which point, account information stored by Twitter may support the 
identification of the physical account holder, but again, this is not guaranteed in all circum-
stances.  As of the time of writing, those who seek a Twitter account have to supply 3 cri-
teria, a full name, valid email address and password. Yet, Twitter states that it ‘doesn’t 
require real name use, email verification, or identity authentication’ (Twitter, 2016b) and 
as a result the account details may not be accurate or attributable to a physical user.  
 
A lack of validation means that any name can be entered leading to varying levels of relia-
bility, depending on whether an offender has submitted correct information and often de-
pendant on where the user intends to use their account legitimately of whether it is for the 
purpose of abuse. The need for a valid email address does provide some support in the 
offender identification process. Services such as Gmail and Microsoft Outlook may imple-
ment various authenticity checks which can involve the use of SMS messages to validate 
the account. What this means is that when a Twitter user creates an account they maybe 
doing so with an email address which has been validated with personal details linking them-
selves to the account. At which point, the email associated with a Twitter account can be 
queried with the provider (for example, Google mail) records for any identifiable infor-
mation. However, this would be an onerous process and not feasible to implement in all 
cases. In addition, the requirement for email account verification varies where in some in-
stances, it is not required during the email account creation process. Ultimately, the cur-
rent account sign up processes mean it is possible for Twitter users to create and send 
content without leaving behind an identifiable trail of evidence.  
       
The final point to consider in the Twitter offender tracking process is the acquisition of 
Internet Protocol (IP) information related to a message to an offending message. It is key 
to note, sender IP information is not supplied via Twitter’s APIs. Twitter’s policy guidance 
states that IP information is only maintained for a ‘short period of time’ (Twitter, 2016b) 
leaving ambiguity as to whether the necessary authority can be sought in time in order to 
utilise this information during an investigation. In addition, IP address information is also 
subject to spoofing and does not automatically guarantee offender identification even 
when present.  
 
5 Concluding Thoughts 
Given the continued popularity of Twitter, it is likely that law enforcement will continue to 
witness acts of illegitimate use. Although publically available data may in some instances 
support the identification of an offender during an investigation, it is likely that support 
from Twitter’s is needed in order to disclose account specific and IP information, despite 
the limitations on this data in place.  When distilled, the problem of detecting offending 
users maintains numerous issues. Time is clearly an inhibiting factor where Twitter’s poli-
cies note (as discussed in section 3) that limitations of data retention are apparent. When 
coupled with time consuming legal processes (although ‘emergency disclosure requests’ 
can be made if the request regards the danger of death or serious physical injury to a per-
son (Twitter, 2016b)), even where data capable of identifying an offender exists, a lack of 
timely procedures to access this content may thwart law enforcement. At present, inter-
national co-operation between police and organisations like Twitter are limited. This prob-
lem is exacerbated by a potential lack of cooperation by organisations like Twitter. For the 
period July-December 2012, Twitter complied with information requests by UK police in 
only 4% of cases (Twitter, 2016d). Figures for July - December 2015 show this figure now 
stands at 76% (Twitter, 2016e). Although there is a clear improvement in response rates, it 
still leaves what could be considered by law enforcement, an unsatisfactory gap. Twitter 
maintains a strong stance on upholding what it considers freedom of speech, noting the 
following statement. 
 
“Twitter continues to defend and respect the voices of our users including their 
right to engage in free expression anonymously or pseudonymously. For example, 
in June 2015, Twitter received a U.S. non-government legal request seeking to un-
mask several anonymous users. Twitter pushed back on the request based on First 
Amendment grounds, specifically the right to speak anonymously” (Twitter, 
2016e). 
 
Twitter also maintains the right to refuse information requests which fail to identify a spe-
cific account or message, of if the request is overly broad in nature (Twitter, 2016e). Fur-
ther, when requests are made, the account holder is notified allowing them to mount a 
challenge or in turn, Twitter may challenge the request themselves (Twitter, 2016e). It is 
difficult to propose or envisage improvements to the process of identifying offending Twit-
ter users as Twitter itself omits to retain the type and volume of information needed to 
regularly identify these individuals. The presented Twitterstream platform constitutes an 
effective mechanism for gathering Twitter data and storing it statically for later analysis 
and use.  However, the identification of individual twitter account owners will likely con-
tinue to depend on the cooperation of Twitter due to limitations in publically available data 
via the APIs. As a result, law enforcement may have to settle for the fact that in some cases, 
the necessary information needed to pursue prosecution is simply just not available, or 
time constraints may inhibit access to it. 
 
5.1 Future Work 
Future work includes the needs to effectively quantify the limitations in data retrieved from 
using both of the APIs through Twitterstream. This would allow the precision and recall of 
the APIs to be established and therefore help law enforcement to make an effective deci-
sion as to when to utilise it during an investigation. In addition, coupling the platform with 
existing techniques for behavioural and sentiment analysis would support the use of Twit-
terstream in investigations of crime occurring during specific events, congregates via spe-
cific hashtag usage. 
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Appendix A 
 
Results Table: The results table contains data pertaining to tweets (see: https://dev.twit-
ter.com/overview/api/tweets) 
 
Field Name Data Type Description 
id_str String The string representation of the unique identi-
fier for this Tweet. 
created_at Timestam
p 
UTC time when this Tweet was created. 
text String The actual text of the status update. 
favorite_count Integer Indicates approximately how many times this 
Tweet has been “liked” by Twitter users. 
in_re-
ply_to_screen_name 
String If the represented Tweet is a reply, this field will 
contain the screen name of the original Tweet’s 
author. 
in_reply_to_sta-
tus_id_str 
String If the represented Tweet is a reply, this field will 
contain the string representation of the original 
Tweet’s ID. 
in_reply_to_user_id_str String If the represented Tweet is a reply, this field will 
contain the string representation of the original 
Tweet’s author ID. This will not necessarily al-
ways be the user directly mentioned in the 
Tweet. 
is_possibly_sensitive Boolean This field only surfaces when a tweet contains a 
link. The meaning of the field doesn’t pertain to 
the tweet content itself, but instead it is an indi-
cator that the URL contained in the tweet may 
contain content or media identified as sensitive 
content 
lang String When present, indicates a BCP 47 language 
identifier corresponding to the machine-de-
tected language of the Tweet text. 
geo_lattitude Decimal The latitude of the status update, if the user has 
geotagged their Tweet. 
geo_longitude Decimal The longitude of the status update, if the user 
has geotagged their Tweet. 
metadata_iso_lan-
guage_code 
String   
metadata_result_type String   
place String When present, indicates that the tweet is asso-
ciated (but not necessarily originating from) a 
place 
place_country String Name of the country containing this place. 
place_country_code String Shortened country code representing the coun-
try containing this place. 
place_full_name String Full human-readable representation of the 
place’s name. 
place_id String ID representing this place. 
place_name String Short human-readable representation of the 
place’s name. 
place_type String The type of location represented by this place 
(e.g. 'city'). 
retweet_count Integer Number of times this Tweet has been re-
tweeted. 
source String Utility used to post the Tweet, as an HTML-for-
matted string. Tweets from the Twitter website 
have a source value of 'web'. 
truncated Boolean Indicates whether the value of the text parame-
ter was truncated, for example, as a result of a 
retweet exceeding the 140 character Tweet 
length. Truncated text will end in ellipsis, like 
this ... Since Twitter now rejects long Tweets vs 
truncating them, the large majority of Tweets 
will have this set to 'false'. 
user_id_str String The string representation of the unique identi-
fier for this User.  
user_created_at Timestam
p 
The UTC datetime that the user account was 
created on Twitter. 
user_default_profile Boolean When true, indicates that the user has not al-
tered the theme or background of their user 
profile. 
user_description String The user-defined string describing their account. 
user_favourites_count Integer The number of tweets this user has favorited in 
the account’s lifetime. 
user_followers_count Integer The number of followers this account currently 
has. 
user_friends_count Integer The number of users this account is following. 
user_geo_enabled Boolean When true, indicates that the user has enabled 
the possibility of geotagging their Tweets. 
user_lang String The BCP 47 code for the user’s self-declared 
user interface language. May or may not have 
anything to do with the content of their Tweets. 
user_listed_count Integer The number of public lists that this user is a 
member of. 
user_location String The user-defined location for this account’s pro-
file. Not necessarily a location nor parseable. 
This field will occasionally be fuzzily interpreted 
by the Search service. 
user_name String The name of the user, as they’ve defined it. Not 
necessarily a person’s name. Typically capped at 
20 characters. 
user_profile_back-
ground_color 
String The hexadecimal color chosen by the user for 
their background. 
user_profile_back-
ground_image_url 
String A HTTP-based URL pointing to the background 
image the user has uploaded for their profile. 
user_profile_back-
ground_image_url_https 
String A HTTPS-based URL pointing to the background 
image the user has uploaded for their profile. 
user_profile_back-
ground_tile 
Boolean When true, indicates that the user’s pro-
file_background_image_url should be tiled 
when displayed. 
user_profile_banner_url String The HTTPS-based URL pointing to the standard 
web representation of the user’s uploaded pro-
file banner.  
user_profile_image_url String A HTTP-based URL pointing to the user’s avatar 
image. 
user_profile_im-
age_url_https 
String A HTTPS-based URL pointing to the user’s avatar 
image. 
user_profile_link_color String The hexadecimal color the user has chosen to 
display links within their Twitter UI. 
user_profile_side-
bar_border_color 
String The hexadecimal color the user has chosen to 
display sidebar borders with in their Twitter UI. 
user_profile_side-
bar_fill_color 
String The hexadecimal color the user has chosen to 
display sidebar backgrounds with in their Twit-
ter UI. 
user_profile_text_color String The hexadecimal color the user has chosen to 
display text with in their Twitter UI. 
user_profile_use_back-
ground_image 
Boolean When true, indicates the user wants their up-
loaded background image to be used. 
user_protected Boolean When true, indicates that this user has chosen 
to protect their Tweets. 
user_screen_name String The screen name, handle, or alias that this user 
identifies themselves with. Screen names are 
unique but subject to change.  
user_statuses_count Integer The number of tweets (including retweets) is-
sued by the user. 
user_time_zone String A string describing the Time Zone this user de-
clares themselves within. 
user_url String A URL provided by the user in association with 
their profile. 
user_utc_offset String The offset from GMT/UTC in seconds. 
user_verified Boolean When true, indicates that the user has a verified 
account. 
id_str String The string representation of the unique identi-
fied for these coordinates. 
latitude Decimal The latitude point of the bounding box. 
longitude Decimal The longitude point of the bounding box. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
